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TOWARD A SPECIFIC INTENT REQUIREMENT IN WHITE
COLLAR CRIME STATUTES: HOW THE PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 SHEDS LIGHT ON THE
“GENERAL INTENT REVOLUTION”
Elizabeth R. Sheyn∗
Abstract
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
of 2010, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010 (collectively, ACA), has altered the landscape of health
care and health insurance. However, it has also served to highlight the
revolution in the intent requirement for white collar crimes. In
particular, the ACA lowers the intent requirement for several health care
fraud statutes from “specific intent to defraud” to “general intent to
deceive,” which is consistent with federal courts’ recent trend of not
requiring proof of the defendant’s knowledge of the law before finding
a violation of a particular statute proscribing a so-called “white collar
crime.” In contrast to some of the ACA’s other substantive provisions,
the constitutionality of these provisions has not yet been considered by
federal courts or evaluated by scholars.
This Article describes this “intent revolution” against the backdrop
of the ACA and other white collar crime statutes and offers some
thoughts on why, and how, the ACA should be curbed, particularly in
the context of white collar offenses.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010,1 as amended by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 20102 (collectively, ACA), has altered the
landscape of health care and health insurance. However, it has also
served to highlight the revolution occurring with respect to the intent
requirement for white collar crimes. In particular, the ACA lowers the
intent requirement for several health care fraud statutes from “specific
intent to defraud” to “general intent to deceive,” which is consistent
with federal courts’ recent trend of not requiring proof of a defendant’s
knowledge of the law before finding a violation of a particular statute
proscribing a so-called “white collar crime.” In contrast to some of the
ACA’s other substantive provisions, the constitutionality of these
provisions has not yet been considered by federal courts or evaluated by
scholars.
This Article describes this “intent revolution” against the backdrop
of the ACA and other white collar crime statutes and offers some
thoughts on why, and how, the ACA should be curbed, particularly in
the context of white collar offenses. First, the Article provides a
background understanding of white collar crime statutes, focusing
specifically on the mens rea requirement component. Second, it takes an
in-depth look at health care fraud and describes typical health care fraud
remedies. Third, the Article outlines the relevant portions of the ACA,
touching briefly on very recent challenges to other aspects of the ACA,
such as the individual mandate requirement. Finally, the Article
analyzes the dangers of a lowered intent requirement broadly and, more
specifically, in the context of the ACA. It also provides a suggestion
regarding how these dangers should be addressed with respect to the
ACA’s problematic provisions.
I. WHITE COLLAR CRIME STATUTES AND THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT
According to one scholar, a white collar crime should be defined by
reference to what it is not: a crime that “(a) necessarily involve[s] force
against a person or property; (b) directly relate[s] to the possession, sale,
or distribution of narcotics; (c) directly relate[s] to organized crime
activities; (d) directly relate[s] to such national policies as immigration,
civil rights, and national security; or (e) directly involve[s] ‘vice crimes’

1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
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or the common theft of property.”3 Several of the most common white
collar crimes fitting this definition, in addition to health care fraud and
related crimes, are blackmail, bribery, embezzlement, extortion, insider
trading, the prohibition on kickbacks, mail fraud, money laundering,
racketeering, securities fraud, and wire fraud.4
One of the most important aspects of a criminal offense statute is the
mens rea provision, otherwise known as the “guilty mind” element,
which is included in such statutes because “[t]he criminal law has
traditionally required not only that the defendant cause a serious harm
(the actus reus) but also that she do so with a particular state of mind—
criminal intent, purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or the like.”5
If an individual commits an act that would otherwise constitute a crime,
but lacks the requisite state of mind, she typically will not be considered
deserving of punishment.6
American criminal law has always focused on the issue of mens
rea.7 For example, the Model Penal Code creates a presumption that a
mens rea component applies to every material element in a crime,
unless a statute clearly indicates otherwise.8 Further, as early as the
1950s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Morissette v. United States,9 noted
the importance of the mens rea requirement by stating:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient
notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of
law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil. A relation between some
mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost
as instinctive as the child’s familiar exculpatory “But I
didn’t mean to[]” . . . .10

3. J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2 (2002).
4. See id. at 2.
5. Stuart P. Green, Moral Ambiguity in White Collar Criminal Law, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 501, 512 (2004).
6. See id. (“People who cause harm without such mental element ordinarily cannot be
said to be ‘at fault.’”).
7. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3 (1994) (“The mens rea presumption
requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s conduct illegal, lest it conflict
with the related presumption, ‘deeply rooted in the American legal system,’ that, ordinarily,
‘ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.’” (quoting
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991))).
8. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1962).
9. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
10. Id. at 250–51.
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Subsequently, in Liparota v. United States,11 the Court reaffirmed
its holding in Morissette.12 It noted, however, that an exception existed
in those cases where the statute “rendered criminal a type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public
regulation and may seriously threaten the community’s health or
safety.”13
However, in many white collar crime statutes, the mens rea
requirement is either low or nonexistent (as in the case of strict liability
offenses), and therefore, it is questionable whether persons accused of
these crimes are required to be “morally culpable, or at least culpable to
the extent that would justify the imposition of criminal penalties.”14
Moreover, courts are divided regarding the appropriate mens rea
requirement for several white collar crime statutes. For example, the
mail and wire fraud statutes are silent regarding the requisite mens rea
and federal courts disagree regarding the necessary level of intent. Some
courts require a general intent to deceive, while others require a specific
intent to defraud.15 Additionally, other statutes use terms such as
11. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
12. Id. at 425–26.
13. Id. at 433. Courts of appeals have “read the Liparota exception as limited to cases in
which the risks created by the defendants’ conduct ‘may be presumed to be regulated because of
their inherent danger.’” John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 211 (1991)
(quoting United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
14. Green, supra note 5, at 512; see also Martin Harrell et al., Federal Environmental
Crime: A Different Kind of “White Collar” Prosecution, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter
2009, at 3. The Harrell article highlights the lowered mens rea requirement contained in many
environmental crime statutes:
One key way that environmental and other white collar cases differ is in the
matter of proof. While environmental defendants are generally held to a
“general intent” standard of conduct because of the nature of the regulatory
program, cases in other white collar areas, such as fraud, require the
government to establish that the defendant specifically intended to cheat
individuals or organizations. Environmental cases sometimes involve people
who set up “sham” businesses, and, in this regard, they are similar to some
fraud prosecutions.
Id. at 28; cf. Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate
Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 314 (2009) (explaining that it is difficult to prosecute white
collar crimes because, among other reasons, “skilled defense counsel will be effective, at least
on the margins, at making the unreasonable seem reasonable, which is particularly helpful for
defendants trying to establish reasonable doubt about the ambiguous areas of moral wrongdoing
sometimes associated with white-collar misconduct”).
15. See United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (“First, and most
importantly, the specific intent required under the mail and wire fraud statutes is the intent to
defraud, not the intent to violate a particular statute or regulation.” (citing United States v.
Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1285 (11th Cir. 1996))); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 518–19
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that mail and wire fraud require a “specific intent to defraud, i.e., a
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“knowingly and willfully,”16 and courts disagree regarding the meaning
of these terms.17 The bribery statute requires that the offense be
committed “corruptly.”18 Other statutes, such as the civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), require a plaintiff to
demonstrate whatever mens rea is required in the provisions prohibiting
the underlying “racketeering activity.”19
A relatively recent trend in the criminal law is the movement away
from specific intent to general intent crimes, particularly with respect to
white collar crimes.20 As one scholar points out, “The courts have
become increasingly receptive to allowing an inference of criminal
mens rea from reckless behavior by defendants.”21 This change is
evidenced by the decrease in use of specific intent, or “willfulness,” jury
instructions and the increase in use of instructions that facilitate the
inference of criminal mens rea from recklessness.22
‘conscious knowing intent to defraud’” (quoting United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d 722, 736 (5th
Cir. 2001))); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Introduction: Tax Evasion as White Collar Fraud, 9 HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 207, 219 (2009) (comparing the mens rea of general fraud statutes to that
involved in criminal tax provisions). Note, however, that in Paradies, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[i]n mail fraud cases, the government need only prove that
the defendant had the intent to deceive.” Paradies, 98 F.3d at 1285.
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
17. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–93 (1998) (holding that “in order to
establish a ‘willful’ violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted
with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful’” and that “unless the text of the statute dictates a
different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense” (footnote omitted) (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137
(1994))); Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341, 396 (1998) (explaining that courts’ decisions regarding the
meaning of the term “willfully” “created a body of haphazard constructions”); Andrea Tuwiner
Vavonese, Comment, The Medicare Anti-Kickback Provision of the Social Security Act—Is
Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L.
REV. 943, 947 (1996) (stating that “[t]he definition[s] of the term[s] knowingly and willfully
ha[ve] been unclear in many areas of criminal law,” and that “[t]he issue is whether the
prosecutor must prove that the defendant consciously and intentionally committed the act or
whether the defendant knew the act was in violation of the law”) (citations omitted).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
19. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–62; Pamela H. Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996
U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 649.
20. See Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been
Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279, 297–99 (1991) (“The
courts’ increased willingness to allow inferences of criminal mens rea from recklessness can be
seen by examining the evolution of the following four jury instructions that define various issues
of intent: (1) specific intent, (2) willfulness, (3) guilty knowledge, and (4) false and fraudulent.”
(footnotes omitted)).
21. Id. at 296–97.
22. See id. at 303 (explaining that changes in four particular “criminal intent instructions
reflect a trend toward diluting the government’s burden of proving criminal intent”: (1) “[t]he
‘specific intent’ instruction, with its emphasis on ‘purposely intending to violate the law,’ is
being phased out”; (2) “[t]he ‘willfulness’ instruction’s reference to ‘specific intent to do
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II. HEALTH CARE FRAUD
Before World War I, patients paid health care providers directly for
their services.23 The providers, in turn, “charged for medical care on a
per-service basis, such as the amount of time spent with the patient or
the type of procedure performed.”24 This practice continued until the
Great Depression.25 Health insurance was developed as a “response to
problems faced during the Depression by physicians and hospitals with
an increasingly cash-strapped patient base.”26 At its inception, health
insurance reimbursed patients for a predetermined portion of their
bills.27 Eventually, insurance began to look much like it does today with
physicians receiving payments directly from the insurer and the insurer
something the law forbids’ appears to be fading and is being replaced with a diluted version of
‘willfully’ that equates willfulness with ‘reckless disregard of the law’”; (3) “at least in the
white collar criminal cases, there is increasing use of the ‘guilty knowledge’ instruction which
allows a jury to infer knowledge of facts from evidence that the defendant deliberately closed
his eyes to what was obvious,” and “[t]o the extent that deliberately closing one’s eyes to the
obvious is behaving ‘recklessly,’ this instruction arguably allows an inference of criminal mens
rea from recklessness”; and (4) “[t]he definition of ‘false or fraudulent representation’ further
facilitates inferences of criminal mens rea from recklessness by defining a false or fraudulent
representation as one made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity”); see also Pamela H.
Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime: An Empirical
Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 476 n.562 (1994)
(observing that “there is a growing trend in white collar criminal cases, not seen with traditional
street crimes, to dilute the mens rea requirement” with “the increasing prosecution of regulatory
offenses where strict or absolute liability suffices for criminal liability, in the willingness of
courts to define ‘intentionally’ as ‘reckless disregard,’ and in the prosecution of corporations,
where current standards of criminal liability contain no mens rea requirement”).
23. See A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 62 MONT. L. REV. 175, 179 (2000).
24. Joan H. Krause, The Brief Life of the Gag Clause: Why Anti-Gag Clause Legislation
Isn’t Enough, 67 TENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
25. See id.
26. Id.; see also Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect
Would Be on American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1358 (1994)
(“[D]octors [around this time] would have considered the fact that their patients would pay for
[expensive diagnostic tests or treatments]. When doctors did recommend a test or procedure,
patients might decline on grounds that it would cost too much.”).
27. See Krause, supra note 24, at 6; see also Alexander M. Capron, Containing Health
Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 708 (1986). The article details how health insurance originally operated:
Because of the profession’s resistance to direct relationships between insurance
companies and physicians, most payment plans developed in the indemnity
format. Under this format, physicians bill[ed] patients directly for services
provided and the patients [were] subsequently reimbursed by their insurance
carrier, sometimes for the full amount they paid or for only a lesser “allowed”
amount.
Id. at 712.
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being reimbursed in accordance with a specific, predetermined fee
arrangement.28 The first such insurance plans were the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plans, pursuant to which “all members of a group paid the same
amount for hospitalization or medical benefits without regard for their
individual medical conditions or likely medical expenses.”29 However,
these and other early health insurance plans had the effect of leaving
elderly, unemployed, self-employed, and low-income individuals
without insurance.30
In its nascent stage, health insurance “offer[ed] some opportunity
for fraud through charging for services not provided.”31 This type of
fraud, however, was generally relegated to state courts, as it concerned a
civil matter litigated between the private third party insurers and the
medical care providers.32 Health care fraud became a matter of federal
concern in 1965, when Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law.33
Both of these programs were based on the Blue Cross/Blue Shield
model.34 “Under Medicare and Medicaid, hospitals were paid for each
service rendered according to the ‘reasonable’ cost of service rather than
to a schedule of negotiated rates. Physicians’ fees were based upon
‘customary’ charges for each service rendered.”35 Through Medicare
and Medicaid, the federal government became a major insurer and
earned the right to be a direct plaintiff in civil health care fraud cases.36
The fee-for-service premise of Medicare and Medicaid led to an
increase in health care fraud because these programs did not have any
28. Krause, supra note 24, at 6–7; see also Capron, supra note 27 (“Over time, however,
many insurance programs adopted the service approach to insurance, in which enrollees’
premiums guarantee[d] them certain services such as a specified number of days of hospital
care, and those providing the services agree[d] to accept the program’s allowed payment as full
compensation.”); Eddy, supra note 23 (“[A]s America industrialized and populations
concentrated, the concept of health insurance developed both as a way to share the cost of injury
and as a way to attract physicians to the expanding, but somewhat undesirable, West by
guaranteeing them a livable income.”).
29. Bryan Ford, The Uncertain Case for Market Pricing of Health Insurance, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 109, 111 n.8 (1994).
30. See Pamela H, Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Providers, 67
N.C. L. REV. 855, 864 (1989).
31. See Eddy, supra note 23.
32. Id.
33. Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290
(1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 426–426a, 1395–1396d (2006)); Medicaid Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396g, 1396i–
1396v (2006)).
34. See Eddy, supra note 23 (“Medicare was constructed following the Blue Cross/Blue
Shield model with fee for service reimbursement by a third party payer mechanism. Part A of
Medicare mimicked Blue Cross paying for hospitalization and Part B emulated Blue Shield
paying for physician services.”).
35. Bucy, supra note 30 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b)(1) (1982)).
36. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 180.
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measures in place to guard against fraud.37 Specifically, the fact that the
more services physicians provide, the more they get paid by the
government, encourages four types of fraud: “1) billing for services not
provided; 2) billing for a service more expensive than that actually
provided; 3) billing for unnecessary services; 4) paying kickbacks for
referrals.”38
Health care fraud prosecutions may be pursued “administratively,
civilly, or criminally.”39 Administrative causes of action are controlled
by the rules promulgated by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and state Medicaid boards; however, these rules change
frequently.40 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,41 “[t]hese
actions are subject to administrative due process” and “are used
primarily to bring individual providers into compliance” with the
appropriate regulations.42 Examples of administrative claims include
“actions brought by the United States Postal Service to enjoin
fraudulent schemes being conducted through the U.S. mail”;43 actions
filed by HHS under the Civil Monetary Penalties Law for “damages
caused by a provider’s fraud or to recollect payments already made to a
provider and later determined to be fraudulent”;44 actions brought by
HHS and the states to terminate providers from participation in
Medicare and Medicaid due to fraud or other improper actions;45 and
actions by State Boards of Registration “to revoke a provider’s
professional license because of fraud by the provider.”46
Civil actions addressing health care fraud are typically brought if
administrative actions were ineffective in deterring fraudulent conduct
or if a provider’s actions are particularly outrageous.47 There are many
civil remedies for health care fraud, and private individuals, insurance
companies, or government entities can bring actions seeking such
remedies.48 For example, private individuals can file malpractice
37. See id.
38. Id.; see also PETER J. HENNING & LEE J. RADEK, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF
PUBLIC CORRUPTION 161 (2011) (defining the term “kickback” and stating that “[w]hile the
bribe must ‘induce or influence’ the defendant’s action, the kickback need only interfere with
the person’s exercise of authority, so that the government would not have to prove a quid pro
quo agreement that links the benefit to a particular government action”).
39. Eddy, supra note 23, at 181–82.
40. See id. at 182.
41. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006).
42. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 182.
43. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873 (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1982)).
44. Id. at 873–74 (footnote omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006).
45. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874; see also 42 C.F.R. § 1004.120 (2006).
46. Bucy, supra note 30, at 874.
47. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 183.
48. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874.
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lawsuits based on fraud against their health care providers49 or they can
bring qui tam actions pursuant to the civil False Claims Act (FCA) to
recover damages caused by provider fraud.50 Insurance companies can
also bring tort and breach of contract suits against providers.51 Further,
Medicare fiscal intermediaries can suspend payments to providers in
order to recover previously paid amounts that were subsequently
determined to be fraudulent.52 The federal government can file civil
lawsuits under the FCA to recover damages caused by provider fraud,53
while state governments, like individuals, can pursue qui tam actions
under the FCA to achieve the same result.54 Federal and state
governments can also prosecute health care fraud civilly by using the
civil RICO and money laundering statutes to obtain asset forfeiture.55
The decision to pursue health care fraud criminally, rather than
utilizing administrative or civil remedies, is usually based on a
determination of whether the evidence is likely to establish guilt by only
a “preponderance of the evidence” or by the higher “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard of proof. The degree of intent and the
amount of damages involved are also considered.56 Federal criminal
prosecutions of health care fraud tend not to proceed under statutes
specifically covering Medicare and Medicaid fraud.57 Rather, these
prosecutions typically utilize the specific statute prohibiting health care
fraud58 or general statutes proscribing mail fraud, wire fraud, or
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2006).
51. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873.
52. See id.; see also 42 C.F.R. § 405.371 (2006).
53. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 873; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
54. See Bucy, supra note 30, at 874; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). States can also
bring civil actions in their own capacity to recover damages due to health care provider fraud.
55. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 183–84; see also Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006) (discussing money
laundering).
56. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 184.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006) (characterizing health care fraud in terms of false
statements and representations).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006); see also Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith,
Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 973
(noting that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) contains a
number of amendments to Medicare and Medicaid laws and makes health care fraud a federal
crime). The health care fraud statute reads as follows:
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice-(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or
control of, any health care benefit program, in connection with the delivery of
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conspiracy.59 Such prosecutions can also be based on the criminal
FCA,60 the False Statements Act (FSA),61 or the Social Security Act
or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. If the violation results
in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), such person
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both;
and if the violation results in death, such person shall be fined under this title,
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both.
(b) With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this
section.
18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2006); Benson Weintraub, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and Increases
Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (Sept. 6,
2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2010/09/the-patient-protectionand-affordable-care-act-of-2010-reduces-the-criminal-mens-rea-requirement-for.html (citing
United States v. Abdallah, 629 F. Supp. 2d 699, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2009)); see also United States v.
Choiniere, 517 F.3d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 2008). Where the defendant was defrauding Medicare,
Medicaid, and private insurance companies, the court employed the language of the health care
fraud statute in the jury instructions:
Another instruction informed the jury that to convict Choiniere, the government
needed to prove both that there was a scheme to defraud and that Choiniere
participated in the scheme knowingly and with intent to defraud. The
instruction further defined “intent to defraud” to mean “that the acts charged
were done knowingly with the intent to deceive or cheat the victims in order to
cause a gain of money or property to the defendant.”
Id.
59. See Bucy, supra note 19, at 591–92; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (discussing
mail fraud); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006) (“Fraud by wire, radio, or television.”); Bria N.
DeSalvo, Katherine M. Keith & Annette Soberats, Health Care Fraud, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
681, 722–23 (2010) (collecting statutes).
60. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006). The statute states:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military, or
naval service of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any
claim upon or against the United States, or any department or agency thereof,
knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned
not more than five years and shall be subject to a fine in the amount provided in
this title.
Id.
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). The statute states:
[W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and
willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry; shall be . . . imprisoned not more than [five] years [or fined
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(SSA).62 State criminal prosecutions of health care fraud typically
reference statutes pertaining not only to Medicaid and Medicare fraud,
but also to controlled substance offenses, larceny, and conspiracy.63
However, as this Article focuses primarily on federal law, a detailed
analysis of state criminal prosecutions of health care fraud is outside of
its scope.
In addition to the statutes mentioned above, the following provisions
can be used to criminally prosecute health care fraud in the federal
context: (1) statutes criminalizing kickbacks (or “payments by one
provider to another for referrals of patients or medical business”64) and
self-referrals,65 “which occur when a provider refers patients to clinics
or companies in which the provider has a financial interest”;66 (2)
statutes criminalizing money laundering—specifically those that
criminalize the movement of illegally obtained money or the movement
of legally obtained money to avoid tax or reporting obligations;67 (3)
criminal RICO;68 (4) the general conspiracy statute69 and the specific
statute prohibiting conspiracies to submit false claims to the
government;70 and (5) the statute criminalizing theft of government
property.71
With many of these statutes, the issue of whether or not the conduct
in question is criminal depends on the intent of the provider.72
Moreover, there is not a uniform intent standard pertaining to all
statutes dealing with health care fraud.73 For example, to establish a
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3751], or both.
Id.
62. DeSalvo et al., supra note 59, at 722; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a7b(a) (2006)
(imposing criminal penalties for acts involving federal health care programs).
63. Bucy, supra note 19, at 592.
64. Id. at 609.
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
66. Bucy, supra note 19, at 609.
67. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–1957.
68. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968.
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 371.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 286.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 641. The statute states:
Whoever embezzles, steals, [or] purloins . . . any record, voucher, money, or
thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency
thereof . . . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; but if the value of such property . . . does not exceed the sum of
$1,000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
Id.
72. See Eddy, supra note 23, at 186.
73. See id. (“The definition of intent varies with the statute invoked to charge health care
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violation of the criminal FCA, the government must show that: “(1) the
defendant presented a false or fraudulent claim against the United
States; (2) the claim was presented to an agency or contractor of the
United States; and (3) the defendant knew the claim was false or
fraudulent.”74 The Supreme Court has held that “‘purpose’ corresponds
loosely with the common-law concept of specific intent, while
‘knowledge’ corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.”75
However, the courts of appeals are divided regarding the requisite
scienter for the criminal FCA.76 Some courts hold “that deliberate
ignorance can establish knowledge of falsity,”77 while others require the
satisfaction of the following, more rigorous standard: “To be false, a
claim must not only be inaccurate but consciously so.”78
Similarly, to establish a violation of the FSA, the government must
prove that the defendant “(1) ‘knowingly and willfully’ (2) ‘[made] any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation’ (3)
in a ‘matter within the jurisdiction of the executive . . . branch of the
Government of the United States.’”79 This statute’s “willfulness”
requirement would seem to require the government to prove that the
defendant knew that making the false statement would be a crime.80
However, it appears that at least some appellate courts maintain that
FSA cases do not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the law.81
fraud.”).
74. United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 142 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 287.
75. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980) (citations omitted); see also Pierre
v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 2008).
76. See United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577, 595 n.9 (6th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 595.
78. United States v. Barker, 967 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991).
79. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2)).
80. See id. at 703–04 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Bryan v. United States, 524
U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998) (“As a general matter, when used in the criminal context, a ‘willful’
act is one undertaken with a ‘bad purpose.’ In other words, in order to establish a ‘willful’
violation of a statute, ‘the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that
his conduct was unlawful.’” (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994))).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The footnote
acknowledges that the “willfully” requirement of § 2(b) must be proved for a criminal
conviction, as the “knowingly” requirement is then inevitably proven:
Although the district judge appeared to attribute this knowledge-of-criminality
requirement to § 1001’s “knowingly and willfully” language, it must, if it exists
at all, be a gloss of “willfully” in § 2(b): no court adopting such a requirement
has questioned the rule that knowledge of criminality need not be shown in
direct § 1001 prosecutions.
Id.
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The “knowingly and willfully” standard is also utilized in the socalled anti-kickback statute, pursuant to which “it is illegal for a person
to ‘knowingly and willfully solicit[] or receive[] any remuneration’ for
referrals for services covered by the federal government.”82 As was true
of the previously mentioned statutes, prior to the passage of the ACA in
early 2010, federal courts disagreed regarding the level of intent
necessitated by the use of the term “willfully,” as it is used in the antikickback statute.83 The same standard is employed in the health care
fraud statute. To support a conviction under this statute,
the government must prove that the defendant:
(1) knowingly and willfully executed, or attempted to
execute, a scheme or artifice; to (2) defraud a health care
benefit program or to obtain by false or fraudulent
pretenses any money or property under the custody or
control of a health care benefit program; (3) in connection
with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits,
items, or services.84
Before the passage of the ACA, unlike all of the above-mentioned
statutes, the courts of appeals seemed to agree that this statute required
proof of specific intent.85
82. United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(b)).
83. See United States v. Mittal, 36 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir. 2002). The court held as
follows:
We have not yet decided whether, in a prosecution for a violation of the
Medicare anti-kickback statute, the Government is required to prove that the
defendant knew of and intended to violate that specific statute. We recognize
the lack of unanimity among the other Circuits that have addressed this
particular question.
Id. at 21 (citations omitted). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Ratzlaf in a
health care fraud case, holding that the element of intent required the defendants to know that
their conduct was unlawful and to undertake that conduct with specific intent to commit the
crime. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995). Subsequently, a
district court in the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit, concluding that Ratzlaf was
distinguishable because it concerned another statute whose language was arguably more
ambiguous than that of the anti-kickback statute. United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491,
494–97 (S.D. Ohio 1995); see also United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440–41 (8th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing the use of the term ‘willfully’ in Ratzlaf with its use in the Medicare antikickback statute). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, adopting an intermediate
position, has required that the prosecutor prove that there is no reasonable interpretation of the
rules which could render a defendant’s statements truthful. United States v. Migliaccio, 34 F.3d
1517, 1524 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus far, the Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of the
term “willfully” in the Medicare fraud context.
84. United States v. Abdallah, 629 F. Supp. 2d 699, 720 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
85. See, e.g., United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 393–94 (6th Cir. 2007); United States
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Federal criminal prosecutions of health care fraud are also affected
by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,86 which created the U.S.
Sentencing Commission that, in turn, promulgated the federal
sentencing guidelines.87 Although the guidelines are now advisory,88
federal courts still generally adhere to the guidelines’ recommendations
at sentencing.89 Thus, individuals convicted of health care fraud can
face steep sentences in accordance with the guidelines because health
care offenses “often stem from an improper billing procedure that has
been repeated for multiple patients,” and therefore, providers can be
charged with multiple counts of the same offense.90
III. THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
The ACA91 is “the most sweeping health care legislation since the
implementation of Medicare.”92 It was designed to provide affordable
health insurance coverage to a larger number of individuals than were
covered by Medicare.93 In an attempt to make health insurance
affordable and available, the ACA permits “individuals and small
businesses to leverage their collective buying power to obtain prices
competitive with group plans.”94 It also “provides for incentives for
expanded group plans through employers, affords tax credits for lowincome individuals and families, extends Medicaid, and increases
federal subsidies to state-run programs.”95 Significantly, the ACA
“prohibits insurance companies from denying coverage to those with
pre-existing medical conditions, setting eligibility rules based on
v. Hickman, 331 F.3d 439, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2003).
86. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
87. See Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 752 n.63
(2010).
88. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d 921, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A district
judge’s reasoned agreement with an advisory sentencing guideline will not be deemed
unreasonable on appeal.”); United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that within-the-guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable and that ‘“when the
district court adheres to the advisory [g]uidelines range,’ § 3553(c)(1) ‘does not impose upon
district courts a duty to engage in . . . particularized analysis”’ (quoting United States v. A.B.,
529 F.3d 1275, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008))).
90. Eddy, supra note 23, at 185.
91. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
92. Health Law Update, KROGER BURRUS, http://www.krogerlaw.com/HealthLawUpdate.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
93. See id.
94. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 886 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(citations omitted).
95. Id. (citations omitted).
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medical factors or claims experience, or rescinding coverage for reasons
other than fraud or misrepresentation.”96
Arguably the most well-known provision of the ACA is the socalled individual mandate requirement, pursuant to which all U.S.
citizens, with some minor exceptions, must “maintain ‘minimum
essential [health care] coverage’ every month beginning in 2014 in an
effort to ‘lower the cost of health insurance, expand coverage, and
reduce uncompensated care.’”97 A citizen who does not comply with
this requirement must pay a penalty enclosed with her tax return.98
Not only has this provision been discussed at length by scholars and
commentators,99 but it has also been challenged numerous times at the
district court level.100 Further, several circuit courts have considered
appeals on the issue.101 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits were the first to issue opinions concerning the
constitutionality of the individual mandate requirement. In the Sixth
Circuit case, Thomas More Law Center v. Obama,102 the plaintiffs—a
public interest law firm and four individuals—sought a determination
that “Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the
minimum coverage provision, and alternatively a declaration that the
96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. Id. (citations omitted). The court identified the congressional intent of implementing
the individual mandate:
Congress found that without the Individual Mandate, the reforms in the Act,
such as the ban on denying coverage based on pre-existing conditions, would
increase the existing incentives for individuals to “wait to purchase health
insurance until they needed care,” which in turn would shift even greater costs
onto third parties. Conversely, Congress found that by “significantly reducing
the number of the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance premiums.”
Id. at 886–87 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health
Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482, 482–83 (2010) (discussing the constitutionality of the
individual mandate); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of StateBased Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 114–18 (2010) (same).
100. See Kevin Sack, Judge Voids Key Element of Obama Health Care Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 2010, at A1 (stating that, as of December 2010, there were approximately two dozen
lawsuits challenging the health care law at the district court level).
101. See Kevin Sack, Judges Weigh Limits of Health Law’s Powers, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2011, at A17 (stating that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits had heard
oral arguments in cases challenging the individual mandate); Lyle Denniston, U.S. Resists Fast
Track on Health Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2011/03/u-s-resists-fast-track-on-health-case/ (“The Fourth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, Eleventh
Circuit and, as of Thursday, the D.C. Circuit have all put health care appeals on abbreviated
briefing and argument schedules, before three-judge panels.”).
102. No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011).
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penalty is an unconstitutional tax.”103 Judge Boyce F. Martin, joined by
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, determined that the plaintiffs had standing to
pursue the suit and that the court had jurisdiction over the action in
accordance with the Anti-Injunction Act.104 Then, Judge Sutton, joined
by Judge James L. Graham, sitting by designation from the Southern
District of Ohio, concluded that the penalty was not a tax “under Article
I of the Constitution,105 and Congress’s taxing power thus [could not]
sustain it.”106 Finally, Judge Sutton joined in Judge Martin’s holding
that “the minimum coverage provision is a valid exercise of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause.”107
In the Eleventh Circuit case, Florida v. United States Department of
Health & Human Services,108 the plaintiffs—twenty-six states, two
private individuals, and the National Federation of Independent
Business109—also challenged the constitutionality of the individual
mandate and the Medicaid expansion.110 Judge Frank M. Hull and Chief
Judge Joel F. Dubina determined, as an initial matter, that plaintiffs had
standing to challenge this provision,111 and then upheld the district
court’s determination that the Medicaid expansion was not
unconstitutional.112 They held that the individual mandate “exceeds
Congress’s commerce power”113 because “[t]he federal government’s
assertion of power, under the Commerce Clause, to issue an economic
mandate for Americans to purchase insurance from a private company
for the entire duration of their lives is unprecedented, lacks cognizable
limits, and imperils our federalist structure.”114 Judges Hull and Dubina
also found that the individual mandate could not be supported by
Congress’s tax power, but held that it was severable from the other
provisions of the ACA.115 Judge Stanley Marcus concurred in part and
dissented in part. He would have upheld the individual mandate as
103. Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *3–4.
104. Id. at *18. The Anti-Injunction Act bars “suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
105. Article I of the Constitution vests certain enumerated rights in Congress. See Paul M.
Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and
Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2331 (2003).
106. Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *64.
107. Id. at *48, *52.
108. 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011).
109. Id. at 1240.
110. Id. at 1241. The ACA “expands Medicaid eligibility and subsidies by amending 42
U.S.C. § 1396a, the section of the Medicaid Act outlining what states must offer in their
coverage plans.” Id. at 1261.
111. Id. at 1244.
112. Id. at 1262.
113. Id. at 1282.
114. Id. at 1312–13.
115. Id. at 1241.
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constitutional because it falls within Congress’s commerce power.116
Subsequent to these decisions, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and D.C. Circuits also issued opinions regarding the
constitutionality of the ACA. The Fourth Circuit declined to rule based
on the Anti-Injuction Act,117 and the D.C. Circuit upheld the ACA’s
individual mandate provision.118 The Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the appeal from the Eleventh Circuit and is slated “to decide not only
whether the mandate is constitutional but also, if it is not, how much of
the balance of the . . . [ACA] must fall along with it.”119
Aside from providing a brief background, this Article does not focus
on the provisions of the ACA that specifically relate to health care
coverage. Rather, it examines the parts of the ACA that have an effect
on existing statutes, such as the anti-kickback statute and the health care
fraud statute.
First, the ACA revises the intent requirement of the anti-kickback
statute by inserting into the statute a subsection (h), which states: “With
respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual
knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this
section.”120 Commentators have suggested that “[t]his new standard will
impact transactions and arrangements counseling and could potentially
create significant criminal and civil fraud exposure for transactions and
arrangements where there is no intent to violate the statute.”121 The
ACA also provides that a violation of the anti-kickback statute
constitutes a violation of the civil FCA.122 Although the ACA
specifically references the civil FCA, zealous prosecutors could attempt
to apply it in the criminal FCA context. Second, the ACA clarifies the
health care fraud statute’s intent requirement by adding to the statute a
subsection (b), which states: “With respect to violations of this section,
116. Id. at 1365 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept.
8, 2011).
118. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, No. 11-5047 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).
119. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Health Care Case as Race Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2011, at A1.
120. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320a-7b(h)).
121. Kathleen McDermott et al., New Healthcare Fraud and Abuse and Program Integrity
Provisions: Let’s Fasten Our Seat Belts for the Bumpy Ride, AHLA CONNECTIONS, May 2010,
at 13, available at www.healthlawyers.org/News/Connections/CurrentIssue/Documents/2010%2
0Features/Feature_May10.pdf.
122. Alan J. Sobol, Staying on Top of the Issues: New Developments for White Collar
Lawyers and their Clients, ASPATORE, 2010 WL 5312568, at *1 (Dec. 2010); see also Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat. 119, 759 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g))
(“In addition to the penalties provided for in this section or section 1128A, a claim that includes
items or services resulting from a violation of this section constitutes a false or fraudulent claim
for purposes of subchapter III of chapter 37 of title 31, United States Code.”).
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a person need not have actual knowledge of this section or specific
intent to commit a violation of this section.”123 Additionally, the ACA
provides that a violation of the health care fraud statute constitutes a
false claim in violation of the civil FCA124 and amends the definition of
“federal crime of health care fraud” to include violations of the antikickback statute, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).125 Relatedly, the
ACA amends the federal sentencing guidelines, as they relate to
individuals convicted of offenses related to any federal health care
program.126 Pursuant to this amendment, the offense level for these
individuals will increase between 20% and 50% if the loss involves
more than a million dollars.127 According to some commentators, “In a
highly regulated industry, with a myriad of complex regulations, these
provisions effectively increase exposure for a broad array of business
and regulatory activities where there is no specific intent to violate the
provisions of the statute.”128
IV. THE DANGERS OF A LOWERED INTENT REQUIREMENT IN THE WHITE
COLLAR AND HEALTH CARE CONTEXTS
All of the challenges to the ACA thus far have focused on the
individual mandate provision. As a result, no court has evaluated the
effect of the ACA’s lowering of the intent requirement pertaining to a
number of health care fraud statutes and the corresponding increase in
the severity of the guidelines with respect to health care fraud offenses.
A. The Reduction or Elimination of the Mens Rea Requirement in
White Collar Crime Statutes
The ACA is only the latest statute evincing the trend of the
diminution or elimination of the mens rea requirement in criminal
statutes. With respect to the health care context, prior to the enactment
of the ACA, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA)129 criminalized certain HIPAA violations that were committed
through willful neglect, which was not defined by the statute.130 The
123. Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(b), 124 Stat. 119, 1008 (2010); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347 (2006) (proscribing health care fraud).
124. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1313(a)(6)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 185 (2010).
125. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(c), 124 Stat. 119, 1008 (2010).
126. McDermott et al., supra note 121, at 16.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
130. Jon A. Sale et al., Emerging Trends in Criminal Healthcare Law Enforcement: The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Reduces the Criminal Mens Rea
Requirement for Healthcare Fraud and Increases Penalties Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, HEALTH L., Feb. 2011, at 20.
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Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH), which amended HIPAA and is part of ARRA,131 defined
“willful neglect” as follows: “conscious, intentional failure or reckless
indifference to the obligation to comply with the administrative
simplification provision violated.”132 Thus, the relevant level of intent
suggested by this term is something close to negligence, and it does not
appear that an awareness of wrongdoing is required.
Concerning white collar crime statutes in general, according to a
study conducted in May 2010 by the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers and the Heritage Foundation, from 2005 through
2006, members of Congress proposed 446 non-violent offenses with
diminished mens rea requirements. Of these, thirty-six were enacted
into law.133 The study also noted that in a “sharp break” with the prior
tradition of requiring the government to prove that the defendant acted
with a guilty mind, meaning that she knew that her conduct was
unlawful or was at least on notice that she could possibly be subject to
criminal liability, “the recent proliferation of federal criminal laws has
produced scores of criminal offenses that lack adequate mens rea
requirements and are vague in defining the conduct that they
criminalize.”134
To satisfy due process requirements, thereby also avoiding a finding
of vagueness, a statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.”135 The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that “the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of
mens rea.”136 Thus, a specific intent requirement may allow a statute to
avoid being invalidated on the grounds of vagueness while the same
would not be true of a general intent provision.137
131. See Nicolas P. Terry, Physicians and Patients Who “Friend” or “Tweet”: Constructing
a Legal Framework for Social Networking in a Highly Regulated Domain, 43 IND. L. REV. 285,
317 (2010).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 160.401 (2010).
133. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS
ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW, at X (2010), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/WhiteCollar/WithoutIntent/$FILE/WithoutIntentReport.pdf.
134. Id.
135. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Paul H. Robinson, Fair
Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 356 (2005)
(describing the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
136. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979).
137. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The Court reinforced the notion that a
specific intent requirement would serve to help prevent challenges to the application of a statute:
[W]here the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the
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Recently, in Skilling v. United States,138 the Court considered the
argument that another significant white collar crime statute, the honestservices fraud statute,139 was unconstitutionally vague. Section 1346 of
the statute states that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term
‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.”140
With respect to the premise of the case, Jeffrey Skilling, the former
chief executive officer of Enron, and other high-ranking Enron
executives were alleged to have “engaged in a wide-ranging scheme to
deceive the investing public, including Enron’s shareholders, . . . about
the true performance of Enron’s businesses by: (a) manipulating
Enron’s publicly reported financial results; and (b) making public
statements and representations about Enron’s financial performance and
results that were false and misleading.”141 Further, these individuals
allegedly “enriched themselves as a result of the scheme through salary,
bonuses, grants of stock and stock options, other profits, and
prestige.”142 The first count of the indictment charged Skilling with
conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud and specifically alleged
that he had sought to ‘“depriv[e] Enron and its shareholders of the
intangible right of [his] honest services.’”143 The indictment also
charged Skilling with “more than 25 substantive counts of securities
fraud, wire fraud, making false representations to Enron’s auditors, and
insider trading.”144
Following a four-month trial, a Houston jury found Skilling guilty
of nineteen counts,145 including one count of conspiracy to commit
honest-services wire fraud.146 On appeal before the Fifth Circuit,
purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to
suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a
violation of law. The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may
not render certain, for all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is
in some respects uncertain. But it does relieve the statute of the objection that it
punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.
Id. at 102.
138. 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
140. Id.
141. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2908 (quoting the indictment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Id. (quoting the indictment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. (quoting the indictment).
144. Id.
145. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1.
146. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2911. The honest-services wire-fraud charge was based on 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 1343, 1346 (2000). Section 371 states in part that if two or more persons
conspire to defraud the United States or any agency thereof “and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
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Skilling raised two questions: (1) whether “pretrial publicity and
community prejudice prevented him from obtaining a fair trial”; and (2)
whether “the jury improperly convicted him of conspiracy to commit
honest-services wire fraud.”147 The Fifth Circuit answered no to both
questions and affirmed Skilling’s conviction.148 Skilling then appealed
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari.149
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit regarding the
failure of Skilling’s fair trial argument.150 However, it disagreed with
the Fifth Circuit regarding that court’s rejection of Skilling’s honestservices argument.151 The Court held that Congress had not spoken
clearly enough with respect to § 1346.152 It stated that, according to its
precedent, the honest-services statute should be narrowly construed,
rather than invalidated.153 The Court then went on to limit the statute’s
application by holding that it could apply only to “fraudulent schemes to
deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied
by a third party who had not been deceived.”154 If § 1346 was construed
to extend beyond schemes to defraud involving bribes and kickbacks,
such an extension “would encounter a vagueness shoal.”155 Thus, the
Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision in part, determining that
“[b]ecause Skilling’s alleged misconduct entailed no bribe or kickback,
it d[id] not fall within § 1346’s proscription.”156

not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 1343 provides in part that anyone
who has devised “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” and who “transmits . . . by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any
writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Finally, § 1346 states that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
147. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2901.
148. See id. at 2912.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2925.
151. See id. at 2935.
152. Id. at 2932; see also Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 251, 252 (2010).
153. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928; see also U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973) (“As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can,
but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional
limitations.”); United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (noting “[t]he
strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress”).
154. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2928.
155. Id. at 2907.
156. Id.
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Similarly, in United States v. Moore,157 the D.C. Circuit considered
whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for
making a materially false statement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2), because he signed a false name on a U.S. Postal Service
delivery form.158 The defendant admitted that he willfully signed a false
name on the form, but argued that no rational factfinder “could have
found the false name was ‘material’ to any matter within the jurisdiction
of the federal Government.”159 The majority first held that a statement
was material if it had a natural tendency to influence, or was “capable of
influencing, either a discrete decision or any other function of the
agency to which it was addressed.”160 It then upheld the defendant’s
conviction, noting that “a statement need not actually influence an
agency in order to be material; it need only have ‘a natural tendency to
influence, or [be] capable of influencing’ an agency function or
decision.”161
Judge Brett Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion to discuss “one of
the difficult issues that can arise in prosecutions under the evermetastasizing § 1001—namely, the mens rea requirements for the
statute, which by its text proscribes only those false statements that are
‘knowingly and willfully’ made.”162 Judge Kavanaugh explained that
the defendant had been tried twice for various drug offenses, but both
trials ended in a hung jury.163 Prior to the second trial, the government
added a false statements charge under § 1001 based on the defendant’s
signing of the wrong name on a U.S. Postal Service delivery form; this
form “contained no warning that an inaccurate statement might be a
crime.”164 At trial, the defense did not ask for an instruction regarding
knowledge, and the government was not required to prove that the
defendant knew of the criminality of his conduct.165 The defendant was
convicted of the false statements charge and was sentenced to five years
in prison on this count.166
In light of this case, Judge Kavanaugh noted that “§ 1001
prosecutions can pose a risk of abuse and injustice” because this
provision “applies to virtually any statement an individual makes to
virtually any federal government official—even when the individual
making the statement is not under oath (unlike in perjury cases) or
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

612 F.3d 698 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 700.
Id. at 701.
Id. at 701–02 (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).
Id. at 702 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
See id.
Id. at 702–03.
Id. at 703.
Id.
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otherwise aware that criminal punishment can result from a false
statement.”167 Judge Kavanaugh therefore argued that requiring “proof
that the defendant knew that making the false statement would be a
crime” could “mitigate the risk of abuse and unfair lack of notice in
prosecutions under § 1001 and other regulatory statutes.”168 In doing so,
Judge Kavanaugh relied on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bryan v.
United States169 and the Court’s subsequent decisions on point.170
Nevertheless, Judge Kavanaugh agreed with the majority’s decision
affirming the defendant’s conviction because the defendant never
argued “that the term ‘willfully’ in § 1001 requires proof of the
defendant’s knowledge of the law, and he did not challenge the jury
instructions on that basis.”171 Judge Kavanaugh cautioned, however,
that where the defendant raises the issue, it is likely that the district
court would have to give “a willfulness instruction that requires proof
that the defendant knew h[er] conduct was a crime,” and that, in other
cases involving § 1001, where the government is unable to prove that
the defendant knew of the unlawfulness of her conduct, “it would seem
inappropriate and contrary to § 1001’s statutory text to impose criminal
punishment.”172
Additionally, in Flores-Figueroa v. United States,173 the Court
considered whether a federal criminal statute forbidding “[a]ggravated
identity theft,” which imposed “a mandatory consecutive 2-year prison
term upon individuals convicted of certain other crimes if, during (or in
relation to) the commission of those other crimes, the offender
‘knowingly transferr[ed], possesse[d], or use[d], without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person,’” required the
government to show that the defendant knew that the “means of
identification” belonged to “another person.”174 The defendant admitted
that he had intended to obtain phony identification numbers, but denied
167. Id.; see also United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 82 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that § 1001 can be used to punish “the most casual false statements so long
as they turned out, unbeknownst to their maker, to be material to some federal agency
function . . . [making] ‘a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal
law’” (quoting Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982))).
168. Moore, 612 F.3d at 703 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
169. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
170. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57 n.9 (2007) (“[W]e have
consistently held that a defendant cannot harbor such criminal intent unless he acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dixon v. United
States, 548 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (holding that the term “willfully” “requires a defendant to have
acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. Moore, 612 F.3d at 704 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
172. Id.
173. 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
174. Id. at 1888 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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having knowledge that the numbers actually belonged to another
person.175 The Court agreed with the defendant and held that
§ 1028A(a)(1) required the government to prove “that the defendant
knew that the means of identification at issue belonged to another
person.”176 This holding was premised on the basic rules of grammar
and the most natural meaning of the statute’s plain language.177
Moreover, Justice Samuel Alito pointed out in his concurring opinion
that when interpreting a criminal statute like this one, “it is fair to begin
with a general presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all the
elements of an offense, but it must be recognized that there are instances
in which context may well rebut that presumption.”178 In this case,
Justice Alito pointed out that the government had not rebutted this
presumption because it had “not pointed to contextual features that
warrant[ed] interpreting [the aggravated identity theft statute] in a
similar way” as the other statutes where the courts had held that the
government did not need to prove the “knowingly” intent as to every
element of the crime.179
B. The Constitutionality of the ACA’s Provisions Relating to Mens Rea
and Sentencing
The ACA’s clarification that health care fraud is a general intent
crime greatly favors the government, which has shown an increased
interest in pursuing this and other health care-related offenses.180 At the
175. See id. at 1889.
176. Id. at 1894.
177. See id. at 1890–94.
178. Id. at 1895 (Alito, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 1896.
180. From 2008 until 2010, the government has been increasing the number of new
criminal health care fraud investigations that it has opened. In 2008, for example, “U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices opened 957 new criminal health care fraud investigations involving 1,641
potential defendants. Federal prosecutors had 1,600 health care fraud criminal investigations
pending, involving 2,580 potential defendants, and filed criminal charges in 502 cases involving
797 defendants.” THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE
HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2008, at 1
(2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2008.pdf. Additionally,
“the Department of Justice (DOJ) opened 843 new civil health care fraud investigations and had
1,311 civil health care fraud matters pending.” Id. By contrast, in 2010, the DOJ “opened 1,116
new criminal health care fraud investigations involving 2,095 potential defendants. Federal
prosecutors had 1,787 health care fraud criminal investigations pending, involving 2,977
potential defendants, and filed criminal charges in 488 cases involving 931 defendants.” THE
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 (2011), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/hcfac/hcfacreport2010.pdf. Further, the “DOJ opened 942
new civil health care fraud investigations and had 1,290 civil health care fraud matters pending
at the end of the fiscal year.” Id.
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same time, the ACA has increased the sentences for these offenses.
Several aspects of the changes brought about by the ACA are troubling.
For example, it has overturned years of precedent with one fell swoop.
Moreover, it has potentially exacerbated the vagueness of statutes
relating to health care crimes.
The constitutionality of the lowered intent standard in the antikickback and health care fraud statutes will be analyzed in much the
same way as the constitutionality of the honest services fraud statute,
the FSA, and the aggravated identity theft statute. Although Congress
appears to have “spoken clearly” in this case, the general intent
requirement, when applied to the anti-kickback and health care fraud
statutes, nevertheless leaves the statutes open to attack on charges of
vagueness.
Broadly speaking, the principles advanced in the ACA, specifically
the reduction of the culpability requirement for several white collar
crime statutes, may “undermine the moral basis of the criminal law.”181
First, as some scholars have noted, this development “denies fair notice,
invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and violates the
separation of powers principle that has traditionally denied federal
courts the power to make common law crimes.”182 As the Supreme
Court held in Lanzetta v. New Jersey,183 “No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands
or forbids.”184 Additionally, in Grayned v. City of Rockford,185 the Court
reasoned that
because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague

181. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1558 (1997); see also
Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent
Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 49 (1995) (asserting that “the
normalizing power of the criminal law is enhanced when the law’s meaning can be easily
ascertained” and that when courts are “satisfied that a criminal statute overcomes due process
hurdles posed by allegations of vagueness and overbreadth,” they “will feel less compelled to
incorporate gross generalizations about ‘traditional innocence,’ and the precise facts that are
likely to be understood as putting average people ‘on notice’ when the fundamental question of
legislative intent can be resolved by simpler means”).
182. Coffee, supra note 13, at 207.
183. 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
184. Id. at 453.
185. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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laws may trap the innocent by not providing a fair warning.186
Thus, persons should not be prosecuted if the statute allegedly
proscribing their actions does not “give fair warning of the conduct that
it makes a crime.”187
Further, many scholars argue that there should be a close link
between “the criminal law and behavior deemed morally culpable by
the general community” because a substantial deviation between these
two factors could threaten the legitimacy of the criminal law.188 To that
end, the government must prove that the defendant had both an “evilmeaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand.”189 One of the main functions
served by this requirement is that persons who are reasonably mistaken
about, or do not know, the law are not (unduly) punished. While it is
difficult to argue that a person who has killed someone did not know
that she was violating the law, it is easy to understand that a person who
was fishing in a local lake without a license might not have known that
she was committing a crime.190 When a statute—like the one
criminalizing fishing without a license—prohibits conduct that a
reasonable person would not know is unlawful, the mens rea
requirement must compensate for the lack of fair notice. A heightened
mens rea standard will ensure that only the person who knew that she
was violating the statute would be punished.
Additionally, a vague statute, according to some commentators, can
be considered a “de facto delegation[] of criminalization authority to the
courts” because courts must “provide the specificity the legislature has
not.”191 This delegation of authority is problematic in several respects.
First, because common law crimes typically do not provide fair
notice,192 which reduces the likelihood of compliance and thereby
diminishes the deterrent effect of the crime,193 most states have

186. Id. at 108.
187. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
188. See Coffee, supra note 13, at 198.
189. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); see also David C. Gray,
Extraordinary Justice, 62 ALA. L. REV. 55, 59 (2010).
190. Cf. Donald Braman et al., Some Realism About Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1531, 1548–49 (2010) (describing “moral” wrongdoing, such as “hitting, stealing, or
refusing to share an abundant good, for example” and conventional wrongdoing, such as
“wearing pajamas to school or work, swearing, or eating lunch while standing up, for example”
and comparing the distinction between these terms to “the legal distinction between acts that are
traditionally described in legal parlance as mala in se and mala prohibita”).
191. Robinson, supra note 135, at 365.
192. Id. at 340; see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 25, 27 (1931) (reversing a
conviction because the defendant did not have adequate notice that the term “motor vehicle”
included airplanes).
193. See Robinson, supra note 135, at 340.
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abolished common law crimes194 and federal law does not recognize
them.195 Punishment for common law crimes can also be inconsistently
applied due to their imprecision, leading to a lack of uniformity in the
law and allowing for potential abuses of judicial discretion.196 Second,
there is little need for courts to create law, given that this sphere is wellcontrolled by the legislature. Third, the legislature is the preferred
means of law creation, as opposed to the courts, because, at least under
the traditional view, “legislatures . . . faithfully represent popular norms,
and hence accurately define the universe of serious norm-breakers,
while prudish old judges seek to impose their unrepresentative values
on an unfortunate population.”197 Moreover, because the legislative
branch is “most directly accountable to the people, only the legislature
[can] validate the surrender of individual freedom necessary to [the]

194. See id. at 339.
195. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements
of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes,
which are solely creatures of statute.” (citing United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32
(1812))).
196. See Robinson, supra note 135, at 341; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575
(1974) (stating that vague statutory language “allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections. Legislatures may not so abdicate their responsibilities for
setting the standards of the criminal law”); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108
(1972) (“[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide
explicit standards for those who apply them.”); Freedman v. Texaco Marine Servs., Inc., 882 F.
Supp. 580 (E.D. Tex. 1995). The court explained the need for uniformity in legal terminology as
follows:
[W]hen the language being construed is subject to only one plausible
interpretation or “fair reading,” uniformity of application and unanticipated
costs will dwindle in significance. However, when the language is vague and
subject to many reasonable interpretations, uniformity of application and the
unanticipated costs associated with each interpretation will become more
telling.
Id. at 583–84; see also Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal
to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 269–70 (2001) (“Because of concerns for lack of notice
and uniformity, many people have raised challenges to the common law approach to defining
‘crimes involving moral turpitude.’”); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201, 214 (1985) (highlighting “the potential
for arbitrary discriminatory enforcement of the penal law and the resort to legal formalism as a
constraint against unbridled discretion” and noting that “[t]he risk involved is that judicial
particularization of the broad rubrics of common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too
closely grounded in the facts of the case at hand, [and] insufficiently abstracted from the
personal characteristics of the individual defendant”).
197. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
576 (2001); see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[B]ecause of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.”).
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formation of the social contract.”198
Finally, vague criminal statutes may fail to deter criminal activity.199
Specifically, as scholars have pointed out, “[w]hen the law is unclear,
persons who are considering some action may not realize that they are
in danger of violating criminal laws. In those circumstances, people do
not stop to weigh the benefit of the conduct against the risk of being
caught and punished.”200 Vagueness is particularly detrimental to white
collar crime statutes, because conduct criminalized by these statutes “is
often based on ethical lapses, betrayals of trust, and deceptions that are
not always [understood to be] crimes.”201 Conversely, vague laws can
over-deter by inhibiting persons from performing perfectly legal acts.202
As Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out, in the First Amendment
context, “When one must guess what conduct or utterances may lose
him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful
zone . . . .’ For ‘[t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions.’”203
The ACA creates problems for defendants not only in the guilt or
innocence phase, but also in the penalty phase of the judicial process. It
contains congressional mandates directing the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to issue guidelines containing more severe penalties for
health care fraud.204 Considered on their own, the use of these mandates
is problematic, as they undermine the Commission’s independent
rulemaking authority to criminalize certain conduct and to impose
minimum and maximum sentences for a variety of offenses.205 As the

198. Jeffries, supra note 196, at 202.
199. Geraldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar
Criminal Law, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 606 (2006).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Dru Stevenson, Toward a New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1535, 1539 (2005) (“Uncertainty breeds caution and restraint. . . .[I]n some contexts
uncertainty can over-deter useful activities.”). See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell,
Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984)
(discussing the impact of uncertain legal standards).
203. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 230 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
204. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606(a)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 119, 1007 (2010).
205. As the Supreme Court has noted, “the Commission fills an important institutional role:
It has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical data and national
experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise.’” Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (quoting United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007). The Court
articulated the role the Commission would play:
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Supreme Court held in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,206 when Congress explicitly leaves a gap for an
agency to fill, “there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency.”207
The mandates direct the Commission to amend the guidelines and
policy statements that apply to individuals who have been convicted of
federal health care offenses “involving [g]overnment health care
programs to provide that the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills
submitted to the [g]overnment health care program shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss by the
defendant[.]”208 Further, the mandates require the Commission to
amend the guidelines by instituting a scheme of offense level
enhancements based upon the amount of loss involved in the federal
health care fraud offense.209 A two-level enhancement would be
imposed if the loss is between one and seven million dollars, a threelevel increase would be imposed if the loss is between seven and twenty
million dollars, and a four-level increase would be imposed if the loss is
not less than twenty million dollars.210
Acting in accordance with the ACA, the Commission published a
notice of its request for public comment211 to implement the ACA’s
directives regarding health care fraud offenses.212 In giving effect to the
ACA’s directives, the Commission proposed adding two provisions to
§ 2B1.1, both of which would apply to cases “in which the defendant
[was] convicted of a Federal health care offense involving a
Government health care program.”213 The first provision consists of a
set of sentence enhancements that would apply depending on the
The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and the Guidelines
themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and
courts of appeals in that process. . . . The Commission will collect and examine
the results. In doing so, it may obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law
enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and
others. And it can revise the Guidelines accordingly.
Id.; see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (“[T]he Sentencing Commission
remains in place, writing Guidelines, collecting information about actual district court
sentencing decisions, undertaking research, and revising the Guidelines accordingly.”).
206. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
207. Id. at 843–44.
208. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1 (2011),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_2_A-C.pdf.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,927, 41,927 (July 19,
2010).
212. Id. at 41,928.
213. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2.
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amount of loss, with the most significant difference from the directive
being that “tiers of the enhancement [would] apply to loss amounts
‘more than’ the specified dollar amounts rather than to loss amounts
‘not less than’ the specified dollar amounts to ‘ensure reasonable
consistency’ as required by the directive[s].”214 The second provision
consists of a new special rule for determining intended loss in these
types of cases. Pursuant to this rule, “the aggregate dollar amount of
fraudulent bills submitted to the Government health care program shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the amount of the intended loss, i.e.,
is evidence sufficient to establish the amount of the intended loss, if not
rebutted.”215Additionally, the proposed amendment defines the terms
“Federal health care offense” and “Government health care program” in
the commentary to § 2B1.1.216 “Federal health care offense” is defined
in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 24 to mean “a violation of, or a criminal
conspiracy to violate (1) section 669, 1035, 1347, or 1518 of this title”;
or “(2) section 287, 371, 664, 666, 1001, 1027, 1341, 1343, or 1954 of
this title if the violation or conspiracy relates to a health care benefit
program.”217
“Government health care program,” in this context, means “any plan
or program that provides health benefits, whether directly, through
insurance, or otherwise, which is funded directly, in whole, or in part,
by federal or state government.”218 Examples of such programs,
according to the proposed amendment, include Medicare, Medicaid, and
the Children’s Health Insurance Program.219
Further, the proposed amendment changes the wording of
Application Note 3(A) to § 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role) to state that a
defendant who is accountable “for a loss amount under § 2B1.1 that
greatly exceeds the defendant’s personal gain from a fraud offense, and
who had limited knowledge of the scope of the scheme” can still be
eligible for a mitigating role adjustment.220 Finally, the proposed
amendment establishes that a person who commits the crime of making
a false statement in connection with the marketing or sale of multiple
employer welfare arrangements under ERISA, a new offense created by
the ACA, can be imprisoned for a term of no more than ten years.221
The proposed amendment raises several concerns. First, its
treatment of the terms “loss” and “relevant conduct” is inconsistent with
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
See id.
18 U.S.C. § 24(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2.
See id.
Id.
See id.
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that used by the guidelines. Generally, loss and relevant conduct are
relegated to the province of judicial determination and involve an indepth factual inquiry.222 As a post-Booker v. United States223 case
stated, “The Guidelines do not present a single universal method for
loss calculation under § 2B1.1—nor could they, given the fact-intensive
and individualized nature of the inquiry.”224 However, the ACA’s
directive states that prima facie evidence of the amount of intended loss
is “the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills submitted to the
Government health care program.”225 Thus, it appears that the ACA is
attempting to circumvent the traditional means of determining loss and
relevant conduct through its directives. By way of a remedy, one
commentator has suggested that the best practice would be to recognize
that programs like Medicare and Medicaid pay only 80% of the amount
billed (or the amount of the intended loss under the ACA),226 and that
the fraud guidelines provide “myriad credits, offsets, and exclusions
from the loss calculus.”227 Otherwise, when they go into effect, the new
guidelines will likely lead to significant sentencing disparities and
resulting litigation.228
222. See United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When applying
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to determine the amount of loss, the district court ‘need only make a
reasonable estimate’ of the amount. The United States’s burden is to prove the amount of loss
by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Isiwele, 635 F.3d
196, 203 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting the need for a “fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry into the
defendant’s intent in determining ‘intended loss’ for sentencing purposes” in the health care
fraud context); United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Thus, where
provided by the Guidelines, a district court may examine relevant conduct to determine the
applicable Guidelines range, even if not captured as an element of the offense of conviction.”);
United States v. Miller, 316 F.3d 495, 504 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the amount fraudulently
billed to Medicare or Medicaid is “prima facie evidence of the amount of loss [the defendant]
intended to cause,” but “the amount billed does not constitute conclusive evidence of intended
loss; the parties may introduce additional evidence to suggest that the amount billed either
exaggerates or understates the billing party’s intent”).
223. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Booker held that the guidelines were not binding on federal
courts. Id. at 233–34; see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing
Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 90 (2011).
224. United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 2007).
225. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 208, at 2.
226. See United States v. Nachamie, 121 F. Supp. 2d 285, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The
intended loss figure is the capped amount that Medicare typically pays per procedure code,
reduced by 20%.”).
227. Sale et al., supra note 130, at 23 (citation omitted).
228. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007). The Court set out a nonexhaustive list of requirements that sentencing courts must consider:
Under the post-Booker federal sentencing system, . . . sentencing courts must
take account of the general sentencing goals set forth by Congress, including
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities, providing restitution to victims,
reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law,
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The sentencing aspects of the ACA also raise broad concerns. White
collar offenders are generally less likely to recidivate.229 Thus, the
ACA’s focus on retributive sentencing undermines the traditional
sentencing paradigm, which balances a number of sentencing
purposes,230 and may create unwarranted disparities between white
providing just punishment, affording adequate deterrence, protecting the public,
and effectively providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training and medical care.
Id. at 300 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H.
Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1319–20 n.139 (2006), explaining that the
most notable effort to impose consistency on the litigation process is reflected
in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which required federal
sentencing judges to consider the “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct,” and required judges to follow, in most cases, the
Sentencing Guidelines established by the United States Sentencing
Commission, . . .
but that the Supreme Court subsequently held that the Guidelines were “unconstitutional
because they caused sentences to be increased on the basis of offense characteristics that were
not found by a jury beyond reasonable doubt, and . . . that the Guidelines could not be treated as
mandatory.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1326–27 (2005)
(footnotes omitted). It has yet to be determined whether the implementation of the guidelines
has aided in furthering uniformity among the district courts or has in fact increased sentencing
disparities:
The available evidence suggests that the guidelines have succeeded in reducing
judge-to-judge disparity within judicial districts. On the other hand, researchers
have found significant disparities between sentences imposed on similarly
situated defendants in different districts and different regions of the country,
and interdistrict disparities appear to have grown larger in the guidelines era,
particularly in drug cases. The question of whether the guidelines reduced or
exacerbated racial disparities in federal sentencing remains unresolved.
Id.
229. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 758 (2007) (“White collar offenders, especially those coming from the
corporate arena, are usually first offenders. Additionally, there is little likelihood of recidivism.
The individual seldom can resume a position of power that would allow for continued
criminality of this nature.”); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE
CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 30 (2004),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/Recidivism/200405_Recidivi
sm_Criminal_History.pdf (stating that the recidivism rate of persons convicted of fraud offenses
is lower than that of persons convicted of drug trafficking, larceny, firearms, robbery, or any
other offenses).
230. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 n.6 (2007) (listing the factors that a district
court must consider in sentencing a defendant, which include: (1) “the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the need for the sentence
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collar defendants on a nation-wide basis.231
Given the problems associated with the ACA provisions described
above, as well as the increase in litigation concerning purportedly vague
white collar crime statutes, it is likely that the aspects of the ACA
touching on white collar crime will also come under fire. To avoid this
result, Congress should overturn, or return to their previous state, those
sections of the ACA that lower the intent requirements of the antikickback and health care fraud statutes, as well as those that amend the
federal sentencing guidelines as they pertain to individuals convicted of
offenses related to any federal health care program.
CONCLUSION
Although federal courts have been preoccupied with the other
provisions of the ACA, particularly the individual mandate requirement,
there has been no examination of the provisions of the ACA that have
lowered the intent requirement for several health care fraud statutes
from specific intent to general intent and that have changed the
sentencing guidelines as they relate to persons violating the relevant
health care fraud laws. These provisions are consistent with the overall
trend toward general intent, rather than specific intent, as a prerequisite
to a finding of a violation of a particular statute proscribing a white
collar crime. This Article describes the so-called “intent revolution” in
the context of several white collar statutes, including those affected by
the ACA, evaluates the pitfalls of a lowered intent requirement in white
collar crime statutes, and calls upon Congress to overturn the portions
of the ACA discussed herein.

(a) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense”; (b) “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (c) “to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (d) “to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in [the]
most effective manner”; (3) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”; and (4) “the
need to provide restitution to any victim” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
231. See James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Reflect Community Values?, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 180 n.36 (2010) (“In
considering the direction to avoid unwarranted disparities under 28 U.S.C. § 3353(a)(6),
sentencing courts principally consider national disparities, not intra-case disparities.”).
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